issues. This criticism implicitly assumes that science should only be involved in the making of models that are "actual" (by opposition to what-if) and "specific" (by opposition to abstract).
Introduction
The Gaia hypothesis (GH) was originally proposed by Lovelock and Margulis (1974) in a foundational article entitled "Atmospheric homeostasis by and for the biosphere: the Gaïa hypothesis" in which the authors suggested that the influence of life on the geological environment may contribute to a global homeostasis, which lead them to compare the ensemble comprising all the living beings and the environment with which they interact to an organism. The fact that the Earth does not reproduce and can not undergo natural selection was pointed out as problematic for the emergence of homeostasis at this level. It was indeed argued that it is because genuine organisms can undergo natural selection that they exhibit homeostasis and then claimed first that Earth cannot undergo natural selection because it does not reproduce, second that appealing to natural selection at lower levels would still carry the theoretical problems of group selection (Dawkins, 1982, 235-237) . Given these theoretical difficulties, GH teleological claims are not justified. Ever since, philosophers of biology turned their back to what appeared to be nothing more than a misleading metaphor.
The fact that GH has been considered to be very controversial by the vast majority of biologists and philosophers of science makes it very interesting from a philosophical point of view: the intensity of the debate has led to sharp discussion and critiques of several epistemological issues. James Kirchner has undoubtedly made the most informed critiques of GH. He greatly contributed to a clarification of its explanandum and confronted GH with a number of interesting epistemological problems: the role of metaphors in science, the demarcation between science and pseudo-science, the nature and roles of models (Kirchner 1989) .
A substantial scientific literature, mostly led by geoscientists (Lovelock, Watson, Lenton, Volk, Kleidon, Kirchner, etc.) but not only (Margulis, Wilkinson), starting in the 1980's and 4 expanding in the late 1990's, was dedicated to the development of GH. After the early critiques, several directions of research have been envisaged, from empirical to more theoretically orientated ones, that took either the form of verbal arguments or of computational models. It is worth noting that the very first answer to critiques did not take the form of verbal arguments addressing the status of natural selection, or of the import of elements from general philosophy of science (those came later in the debate), but was the publication, by Watson and Lovelock (1983) , of a simple computational model: Daisyworld.
This model was criticized by Kirchner (1989 Kirchner ( , 2002 Kirchner ( , 2003 on scientific and epistemological grounds. At the scientific level, he claimed, the hypotheses of the original model were too strong. I will not discuss in details all the pertinent scientific critiques raised by Kirchner and partly answered afterwards. 1 The second kind of critique that Kirchner raised is an epistemological one. It dismisses the model Daisyworld -or rather, as I will show, the questions Daisyworld is meant to answer -as non-scientific at worst, and not interesting at best. Contrary to the scientific critiques, epistemological ones have not been taken so seriously by the authors of GH.
Rather than beginning with general philosophical considerations over the status of models in science and then evaluating how they could be used or applied in the context of GH, this article will proceed the other way around. It starts with a brief overview of GH to understand where the debate on models originated from. It then makes explicit the critiques addressed to
Daisyworld by elaborating a typology of different kinds of models used in the context of GH.
The typology contrasts the supposedly wrong kinds of model ("abstract" and "what-if") with 1 For reviews, see Wood et al. (2008) , McDonald-Gibson et al. (2008) , Williams (2009), Dutreuil (2013) .
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allegedly better kinds of model ("actual and specific"). What good are abstract and what-if models? The question is twofold: (i) are "abstract" and "what-if" models legitimate in science? And, (ii), are they useful? Contra Kirchner, I will argue that the answer to both questions is a positive one, i.e. that the problems faced by GH are not epistemological (and therefore do not concern the legitimacy of GH's kinds of question or model); rather, the problems encountered by GH models, if any, are conceptual ones (they concern the meaning of some terms) or scientific ones (the hypotheses made by the models).
The typology thus elaborated will prove to be fairly general and the different types of models studied will be shown to be pervasive across the sciences. The discussion over the epistemological status and interest of abstract and more particularly of "what-if" models aims at contributing to recent philosophical discussions over the status of models in science. So the overall ambition of this paper is twofold. It first aims at clarifying the debate over the status of some of the models designed by GH authors: as such, it tackles an issue that is internal to GH.
But it also strives to extend its scope beyond GH to touch upon philosophical considerations over the status of models in science more generally.
Daisyworld: The model and its critiques
GH, often misleadingly summarized as a metaphor comparing the Earth to an organism, is not commonly thought to be worth consideration by the scientific community, and even less so by philosophers of science. 2 However, carefully (or bluntly) dismissing the question "Is Earth 2 Sarkar and Plutynski's judgement of GH as being a "philosophically intriguing idea at the fringe of science" (2010, p. xxiii, my emphasis) belongs to the more sympathetic 6 'really' alive?" as not interesting is not enough to reject GH. This question as such may not, indeed, be interesting; more generally it may also be that the broader question "is X really alive" is not interesting and that one should focus on more specific properties than "being alive", as Sober (1991) has argued. But it is also not the question that GH raises. Neither does GH consider that invoking the fact that Earth is alive provides any meaningful explanation of any biological or geological phenomenon.
Instead, as I have argued elsewhere, drawing in part on Kirchner (1989) , GH focuses on three different questions (Dutreuil 2012) :
-(i) Does life influence geological phenomena (climate, the composition of the atmosphere and oceans)?
-(ii) Can the influence of life on its environment affect Earth's habitability?
-(iii) Can life's activity regulate environmental variables?
Question (i) is unproblematic per se. If there is a contention, it belongs to the history of science and regards the role that GH had in drawing attention to the influence that life may have on its environment. The crux of the matter lies in question (ii) and (iii) and in their distinction; both can be understood as instances of a broader question: "Can life benefit from its influence on the environment?" which is central to GH and to a later movement in ecology positions within the community. According to Ruse (2013) , part of the reasons for the rejection of GH by evolutionary biologists, besides epistemological issues, are to be found in the own insecurity and tension that existed within evolutionary biology at the time GH was proposed (chap. 8).
7 and evolutionary biology, the niche construction literature. 3 Maintenance of habitability is obviously also a question of regulation; so question (iii), in that it deals with regulation per se -and not with regulation as a mean to achieve habitability -is tied to stronger claims of GH attributing to life's influence the capacity to make the environment optimal for life. In conclusion, GH's explanandum cannot be reduced to the question of whether one can genuinely compare Earth with an organism.
Surely, everyone agrees that it was pertinent to point out early, as Doolitle (1981) and Dawkins (1982) did, that a mechanism responsible for the maintenance of homoeostasis at a planetary level was required, given the fact that natural selection does not operate at this level.
But then a reasonable philosophical and scientific attitude consists in paying attention to the propositions that are made or to the explanations that are offered, and not in dismissing the whole GH literature as unscientific for asking a question it does actually not ask.
Since the early 1980's, then, the central problem of the GH has been to find a mechanism that could maintain homeostasis at the scale of the Earth. Watson and Lovelock (1983) made one move in this direction. And again, they did not do so through a conceptual analysis of the notion of reproduction or theoretical refinements on the conditions under which natural selection occurs: they built a computational model, Daisyworld.
The original model stages what the authors describe as an "imaginary planet" where the evolution of temperature depends on only two parameters: average planetary albedo and an external forcing, a gradual increase of solar luminosity. The planet is populated by two species of daisy: black ones have a lower albedo (0.25) than the bare ground (0.5) and white 3 On GH and niche construction, see Free and Barton (2007) , Pocheville (2010) . 8 ones have a higher albedo (0.75). Therefore the relative proportion of white and black daisies (covering the ground) influences the planet's albedo, and hence temperature. In return, the temperature constrains the growth of daisies. So life affects an environmental variable that is affected by an external perturbation and that constrains life's growth in turn. The model is fairly simple, consisting of a few differential equations, and does not explicitly describe space (see fig. 1 .a). The central conclusion drawn by Watson and Lovelock is that "regardless of the details of the interaction, the effect of daisies is to stabilise the temperature"; and this occurs without any form of selection acting at the level of the system itself.
There are three important features of the Daisyworld model. The first interesting aspect of Daisyworld is what I will temporarily call its "fictional" dimension. Recall that the title of Watson and Lovelock (1983) was "Biological homeostasis of the global environment: the parable of Daisyworld" (my emphasis) and that the model was taken to describe an imaginary planet. Many subsequent Daisyworld papers used words pertaining to the semantic field of fiction when talking about their model: "parable", "imaginary planet", "toy model", "toy world", "a caricature of the Earh system", "fictitious Daisyworld", "metaphor".
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Although this vocabulary is common in the modelling literature, it was criticized by Kirchner in the following words:
Building and testing quantitatively appropriate models of real-world atmosphere-biosphere interactions, although harder work than building hypothetical Daisyworlds, is likely to yield more relevant insights for Earth system science.
Recent modelling efforts by Lenton and colleagues (Lenton, 2001; Lenton and Von 9 Bloh, 2001; Lenton and Watson, 2000) are a step in the right direction. (Kirchner, 2003, 40-41) There is no such thing in the world as this simple planet populated by two population of giant daisies. It seems, then, that Daisyworld describes and strives to understand the behaviour of fictional objects (as opposed to actual). Should science take time and energy to understand objects that do not exist and if so, why?
The second interesting aspect of Daisyworld is its abstract, as opposed to specific, nature. The abstract/specific distinction pertains to the level of description. Specific questions bear on particular processes while abstract ones focus on properties that are shared by different processes. Kirchner questions the relevance of models that would be too abstract:
Second, it is important to move beyond simply theorizing. The test of Gaïa theory and models against data has been one of the principal concern of Kirchner, as one can see by looking at the title of its principal contributions: "The Gaïa hypothesis: can it be tested" (1989), "The Gaia hypothesis: fact, theory, and wishful thinking" (2002), "The Gaïa hypothesis: conjectures and refutations" (2003) . I acknowledge the important contributions of Kirchner when he tries to move the discussion toward an assessment of the empirical relevance of some claims of GH (Kirchner 2002 , 395-398, Kirchner 2003 epistemologically sound: are they scientific? are they useful? (ii) Are they less useful than other kinds of model? In the following, I will show that they are scientific and useful, and also briefly touch on the latter question.
Description of the models
Before engaging in a close description of Daisyworld, and other, related models, I want to briefly discuss what models are. One makes a model of a target system in order to gain knowledge, by explanation or prediction, of this particular target system. Making a model can be thought of as a particular strategy within science at large (Godfrey-Smith 2006 , Weisberg 2007 . Regardless of the conception of model that one adopts, two central elements will be preserved: models are representations and models rest on an analogy between the model system and the target system (the model system must resemble in relevant ways the target system). A famous example, discussed by Weisberg, is the Lotka-Volterra system of equations (the model system) representing prey/predator interactions between fishes in the Adriatic sea (the target system). Models can be implemented in different substrates: some models rely on concrete physical objects, others are mathematical, others computational. All models discussed here are computational. Although computational models are based on mathematics, they can be (and should be) distinguished from purely mathematical models (e.g. Lotka-Volterera equations) since they function differently in practice (Weisberg, 2013, 20) and since they raise particular epistemic and philosophical issues in that they are computational and not only in that they are models (Humphreys 2009, Grüne-Yanoff and Weirich 2010) .
I pointed out above that the lexical field of fiction was common in the scientific literature on models. This was in fact the starting point for recent accounts which treated mathematical models as fictional entities (Godfrey-Smith 2009 , Frigg 2010 ). This view is opposed to the one that takes mathematical models to be abstract mathematical entities (Weisberg 2013, ch or what the nature of their target system is.
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Whether one conceives model systems as abstract or fictional may lead one to face different difficulties regarding how knowledge can be attained by them (Levy 2012) . The debate just mentioned thus concerns the ontological status of the model system, an issue on which I will remain neutral. Instead, I will use "abstract", "fictional" and "what-if" as terms qualifying the target of the model, the system the modeller wants to gain knowledge about. This, I think, does more justice to Kirchner's discussion. Kirchner has not dismissed all kinds of model as works of fiction, he has only dismissed those that seem to be about abstract or counterfactual entities.
In the following, I will first describe in detail one model described as "a step in the right direction" by Kirchner (2003, 39) and then turn to examples of the abstract and what-if models that he deemed problematic.
"Good" models: specific and actual
In 1982, one year before the publication of Daisyworld, Lovelock and Whitfield published a paper entitled "Lifespan of the biosphere". Their discussion was rooted in the so-called "faint young sun paradox": climate on Earth seems to have remained stable in the last 4.5 Gyr even though solar luminosity has kept increasing. Lovelock and Whitfield suggested that life may have had an important role to play in fostering silicate erosion, which would have lowered the partial pressure of CO 2 (pCO 2 ) during the past billion years, balancing the increase of solar luminosity. However, since pCO 2 is already very low now, if no other balancing mechanism takes place, temperature will steadily increase in the next hundreds millions of years, as solar luminosity keeps increasing. The biosphere is thus threatened either through a long-term increase of temperature, or through CO 2 -starvation, which raises the question of its future lifespan.
14 Lenton and von Bloh (2001) , cited by Kirchner as a "good" model, is one of the five other models that followed on the topic (Caldeira and Kasting 1992; Franck et al. 2000 Franck et al. , 2006 Li et al. 2009 ). All models aim at answering the question "How long will the Earth remain habitable?". These five models thus need to do two things: (i) evaluate what the most relevant environmental variables constraining the survival of actual living beings are; and (ii) quantify the evolution of the variables that are important to sustain life. As to (i), the answer importantly depends on the living beings taken into account: photosynthetic life may disappear because of CO 2 -starvation if pCO 2 falls below a certain threshold, complex life may disappear because of too high a temperature (greater than 50°C), and in any case no known form of life will remain when the temperature will be so high that water will have escaped Earth. As to (ii), the simulation calculates the evolution of pCO 2 and of mean temperature (two linked variables) based on a simple climate model and on other parameters: solar luminosity predicted from models of stellar evolution, weathering rate, etc.
Two kinds of abstract models
There are two kinds of abstract models, "abstract simpliciter" and "abstract and fictional".
"Abstract simpliciter" models are exemplified by the FLASK model, first published by Williams and Lenton (2008) . They describe the model as follows: A generalized model of sexual reproduction isn't supposed to be about kangaroo sex or fungi sex, but about sex itself.[...] But nothing in the world looks like "sex in general". There is kangaroo sex, Tasmanian devil sex, and human sex, but not sex in general. Sex in general is an abstraction over these more specific kinds of sex. (Weisberg 2013, 116) Whereas it mattered for the specific models described in the previous section that the particular molecule consumed by photosynthetic activity was CO 2 (because CO 2 was involved in other specific relations to other items of the model), for abstract models, the particular nature of the nutrient and waste will be irrelevant: only the fact that all living beings take up nutrient and excrete waste will matter. To be sure, all models may be thought to imply called the "abstract simpliciter" models, described above. What I mean by "abstract simpliciter" -models in which the target system and the model system have the same degree of abstraction -will be better understood by contrast with models that are not "abstract simpliciter", namely "abstract and fictional" model. In the latter case, for different reasons, the modeller does not build a model that is exactly as abstract as its target system: the model is more specific than the abstract properties of interest.
A very good example of such "abstract and fictional" models is provided by the original Daisyworld paper. As Watson and Lovelock (1983, 284 ) put it, "We are not trying to model the Earth but rather a fictional world which displays clearly a property which we believe is important for the Earth". Their model proceeds in two steps: (i) it abstracts away to important properties of living organisms and their planetary environment (organisms are affected by and affect in return their environment which is besides constrained by an external forcing), (ii) it imagines fictive with specific properties coherent with the abstract properties identified before. What distinguishes abstract simpliciter from actual and fictional model is that in the latter case some properties of the entities described verbally are actually implemented in the model and specified in the equations (here through the parametrisation of the albedo of the daisies, their preferred temperature, and so on). One question still remains: should one adopt "abstract simpliciter" rather than "abstract and fictional" models in a particular context of inquiry? It is interesting to take a look at the historical path that led, in the case of the GH, from the latter to the former. About a hundred variations of Daisyworld have been published since 1983. Some of these variations progressively gave up on important elements of the Daisyworld style (weird daisies and specific details) and became more explicitly "abstract simpliciter". This was done in part by symplifying the initial model and by focusing more on the abstract properties of the entities (Harvey 2004 , Williams and Noble 2005 , Dyke and Harvey 2006 , McDonald-Gibson et al. 2008 ). This was also done through the initiation of new kinds of models getting rid off the daisies and hinging on the Artifical Life (A-life) tradition, such as Downing and Zvirinsky (1999) . The FLASK model hails from this A-life branch. It is interesting to point out that despite fictional details being progressively abandoned by some models, others kept the "abstract and fictional" style, such as Boyle et al. (2011) or Weaver and Dyke (2012) . We will discuss whether one should choose between "abstract and fictional" and "abstract simpliciter"
at the end of the paper, as it is related to the epistemic purposes of the models.
What-if models
What these different kinds of model should be construed as a strategy.
Trustworthiness and legitimacy of the models
In order to address the issue of the legitimacy and trustworthiness of computational models it is useful to start with Kirchner's remarks on their testability. Two senses of "testability" can be distinguished in his 2003 article. One seems to be restricted to the comparison of model predictions with empirical data: I shall refer to this use of the term as testabilityO (for "output"). The second sense is broader and close to Popper's criterion of demarcation between science and pseudo-science. Although Popper has remained popular among scientists (Pigliucci 2008) , it is worth remembering that Popper's demarcation criterion (falsifiability) has been seriously put into question for being too narrow in some cases and too wide in others
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(e.g. Lakatos 1978) ; its pertinence has in particular been questioned when applied to the intelligent design debate (McCain and Weslake 2013, Sober 2008, 128-131 ). I will not linger on such general philosophical issues and will choose to understand Kirchner's appeal in a simpler and uncontroversial way, namely that models should at some point be constrained by the "real" world, at least if they are to tell us something about the world.
This being granted, it should not be forgotten that important sources of reliability in a model have nothing to do with empirical data, or with the "external world": they are internal to the model itself (Oreskes et al. 1994 , Barberousse and Vorms 2013 , Winsberg 2006 . Verification of numerical solutions (through benchmarking procedures) is a good example of procedures that are important for the reliability of a model; checking the good behaviour of the numerical simulation after the integration of all the algorithms (routines) is another example. However, these purely computational and mathematical aspects, though important for the reliability of a model, are not our principal matter of concern: what we want to know is how the external world comes into play with a model, how it constrains it in relevant ways so that the model can tell us "something" about the world. The answer to this epistemological question crucially depends on what the "something" is that the model is supposed to tell us. In other words, the way the external world will constrain our model ultimately depends on the reasons for which the mode was made.
So why does one make computational models? There are two answers to this question: to explain or to predict. A computational model can be construed as a tripartite object comprising a model structure (defining relations between properties) that is fed with input values (initial conditions of variables and parameters, that constitute different scenarios) in order to gives us output values (the model predictions). Hence, there are two things in which one may be interested, two reasons why one may build the model in the first place and, accordingly, there are two different ways the external world may come into play. In the case of predictive models one relies on the model structure to obtain predictions only.
Meteorological models constitute a good example: one relies on the model structure (based on the laws of thermodynamics and of fluid mechanics) and on the initial parameters (pressure and temperature fields observed at a given time), to get a prediction of tomorrow's weather. In the case of explanatory models one relies on the match between predictions and empirical data to obtain potential explanations of a phenomenon of interest. One good example may be found in the explanation of the flocking behaviour observed for particular birds: although one
does not know what is responsible for this emergent phenomenon, an agent-based simulation that ascribes particular behaviour rules to entities seems to reproduce the flocking behaviour; so a candidate explanation of the phenomenon is that birds, in nature, obey to rules that are similar to the ones implemented in the simulation (Huneman 2012).
As one can see the description of what is an explanatory or predictive model is highly
intertwined with the issue of how the external world comes into play to constrain or test the model in question. I will thus first clarify the distinction between predictive and explanatory models and then argue that this distinction is the most relevant one if one wants to discuss the "testability" Kirchner seems to be interested in, and that the distinctions abstract/specific and what-if/actual are not the relevant categories in this discussion.
(i) Only explanatory models are testableO.
Again, the reason why one builds an explanatory model is that one wants to identify the potential or candidate explanation for a particular phenomenon of interest. The aim is to identify the causal processes that can lead to a phenomenon. In order to do so, one builds a model that represents possible relations between properties (the model structure) before examining whether the model structure proposed is a good candidate explanation of the 24 phenomenon at stake. (2010)).
This description concerns all explanatory models. Again, the explanatory/predictive distinction is orthogonal to the specific/abstract distinction. Testability is a straightforward process in the case of specific explanatory models (one just needs to compare the model predictions with empirical values obtained by other means); let us see how it would work for abstract explanatory models. I think it is in fact no more problematic: nothing prevents one from testing abstract explanatory models (in the sense of comparing the model predictions with observational data). Indeed nothing prevents one from abstracting away from empirical values and carrying out a qualitative comparison between these values and the model predictions. Kirchner is even caught red-handed doing it when he -pertinently -criticizes ecological Daisyworld model for predicting the stability of ecosystems when observations show the instability of such systems, (Kirchner 2003, 40) .
(ii) Predictive models: why should we trust them?
The case of predictive models is different. Consider again meteorological models. Let us take for granted that they were built in order to have reliable predictions of tomorrow's weather.
Needless to say, one wants the prediction before tomorrow evening. The event in question has not occured yet (or, in other cases, one does not have access to it by any other means than through the model) so the output of the model cannot be compared with anything. values. One may then inductively trust the new predictions because it happens that all the previous ones were successful, even if they were so in part for unknown reasons (some data assimilation procedures in meteorological models may be good examples of this category). In other cases, one never has been and never will be (in practice) able to compare any predictions of the model with empirical data. Either because the future is too distant, or because one will never have a proxy for the past phenomenon of interest. All GH models are of the latter category (the comparison is never possible). A good example is the lineage of "lifespan" models (which, interestingly, received the favour of Kirchner). The knowledge one expects to gain from these models is the amount of time during which Earth will remain habitable: this is an extreme case in which the prediction of the model will of course not be comparable, in theory or in practice, to the "actual value". So why should one rely on such predictive models?
Again, in the case of such predictive models one cannot compare the output with empirical data. It does not matter at all whether these predictive models are abstract or specific; their 26 predictive nature makes them not testable O . The missing piece of the puzzle is the output, the prediction: one built the model in order to obtain the data the model predicts, because one could not access these data otherwise. There is no such option as "I don't like models and prefer doing experiments" -(for a similar argument, see Winsberg 2003 Winsberg , 2006 . This means that the reliability of the output of such predictive has to be ascertained on its own.
Let us try to clarify the situation. In the case of predictive models there is a system on which one thinks one has sufficiently good knowledge; one knows (or one relies on) the relation between the properties that are important to specify the dynamic of the system and one knows (or one relies on) the values of the parameters for a given state of the system. And what one wants to have is the description of the same system at a different time, in a different state. The initial state may be far back in the past or may be the actual state, and the final state (the prediction) may be in the future (e.g. meteorological models) or in the past (e.g. climate models of the precambrian): so "prediction" should not be understood here in its chronological sense, one can make predictions for past phenomena.
Here one relies on the predictions in virtue of relying on the source procedure that led to them: the initial conditions and parameters, the model structure, and the computational process. One may rely on the source procedure for different reasons: one used pieces of reliable knowledge (laws, theories, comparison with other models, etc.) that were established before or elsewhere, one used trustworthy model building techniques and made sure no relevant parameter was forgotten. When one wonders about the reliability of a model, one never wonders about the reliability of the "model as a whole" but always focuses on parts of the model, either the output, either the model structure: in the case of predictive model one wonders whether the model predictions are reliable (given your amount of trust in the model structure and the values of the parameters). By contrast, recall that for explanatory models one 27 examines whether the explanation proposed (the model structure) is a potential explanation (given the success of the comparison of the output with empirical values). So explanatory and predictive models are opposites as to their epistemic situation.
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Let us now examine how this would work when we introduce the specific/abstract categories, to show that they are not the relevant categories to discuss the testability of a model.
In predictive models one has to make sure that the modelling procedure accurately captures the properties of one's target system 9 . So there is a point where discussion is open as to whether the model faithfully represents the empirical world; it is here that the "external world" will constrain the model. And the striking point is that this "discussion" does not differ much in the case of abstract and in the case of specific models. Such a discussion occurred in the case of the lifespan models described above as an example of specific models. Several parameters were refined or added after Lovelock and Whitfield proposed their original model since these were shown to be quantitatively important: plant metabolism (Caldeira and Kasting 1992), a better parametrization of life's influence on weathering (Lenton and von 8 Notice that the same algorithm may alternatively be used to explain or to predict phenomena depending on the epistemic context in which it is used. Besides, I would be happy to grant that there are grey cases where it is not clear in which epistemic situation (prediction or explanation) we are.
9 Notice that one may rely on the source procedure even if one knows that part of the simulation artificially misrepresents the target but one has other reasons to believe in the validity of this model building technique (Winsberg 2006, Grüne-Yanoff and Weirich 2010) .
Bloh 2001), and of geodynamic processes (Franck et al. 2000) . But the very same sort of discussion can and did occur in the case of abstract models. Kirchner showed the problems that some hypotheses of Daisyworld create in misrepresenting life. He pointed out that the model does not allow the existence of black daisies whose optimal growth temperature would be higher than white daisies. Such a situation would create a pathological, instable
Daisyworld (Kirchner 1989, 229) . In other words the environmental preferences and the way in which the daisies affect their environment could not vary independently. The problematic hypotheses were henceforward abandoned (Wood et al. 2006 , McDonald-Gibson et al. 2008 , Wood et al. 2008 . So for specific as well as for abstract models that claim to represent certain properties of life, one may always come up with counterexamples that demand adjustments of the model. The upshot for abstract models is that, although the model itself is a priori and is in a sense not meant to be testable, the claim that the model structure faithfully captures a particular empirical target is itself testable in the sense Kirchner demands (see Weisberg 2006 and Bedau 1999 for analogous points). The overall conclusion is that "abstract" and "what if" are not the right categories to discuss the procedures increasing the reliability of a model; the distinction between predictive and explanatory models is a better help. We have seen that only in the case of explanatory models
can you compare the model predictions with empirical data. This should in no way lead us to disregard predictive models -which are pervasive in all sciences -but rather to acknowledge that the reasons why we rely on the predictions are different from the reasons why we rely on the model structure.
Neither abstract nor what-if models should be thought to be outside of science, even when adopting an updated Popperian stance.
Interest of abstract and what-if models
Let us now turn to the reasons why one may be tempted to make abstract and what-if models.
Why would one want to make such models? Why not be satisfied with specific and actual models after all? I would like to suggest three reasons:
(i) Abstract and fictional models are good for how-possibly explanations.
We have seen that the entities involved in "abstract and fictional" models are meant to resemble actual organisms regarding relevant abstract properties (in the given context of investigation, properties that concern the interaction between organisms and their environment) but to differ from them regarding irrelevant specific properties (here the fact 30 that the entities are huge daisies). What can be the purpose of these apparently irrelevant specific details? In some cases they do not have any purpose but the model will be more specific than its target for contingent reasons or practical constraints.
I will however argue that in other cases -such as the original Daisyworld model -such specific details may serve a distinct purpose. It becomes more apparent if one realizes that the original model was meant to achieve a "how-possibly explanation" in the sense defined by Dray and discussed by Reydon (2012) . How-possibly explanation in Dray's sense are explanations that should not invoke laws of nature because how-possibly explanations do not intend to establish the necessity of the phenomenon to be explained. "As their aim is to establish that the occurrence of the explanandum is not entirely ruled out," Reydon explains, how-possibly explanations "only need to specify those conditions that allow for the explanandum to occur even though given the theoretical and factual context it seemed unlikely or even impossible" (2012, 303).
The definition seems to fit perfectly with the aim of Daisyworld. Recall that it is because natural selection was presentend as the sole explanation of organisms' homeostasis and because of theoretical difficulties (absence of natural selection at a planetary level or problems raised by group selection) that the idea of a global environmental regulation was claimed to require planning or foresight by life. As Lovelock stated, Daisyworld was meant to address this critique: In other words, Daisyworld was presented to show that even in the absence of natural selection at the global scale and without teleology involved, a regulation of the global 31 environment through the influence of life is not theoretically impossible. As pointed out by Kirchner (2002, 401) , if the ambition of the paper was to claim that given our current knowledge of the abstract properties shared by all living beings, homeostasis or maintenance of habitability should necessarily emerge, then the model would not be able to meet this ambition since, as mentionned above, the original Daisyworld only illustrates a restricted case in which the environmental preferences and the way in which the daisies affect their environment can not vary independently. But if the ambition is only to show that homeostasis could emerge in plausible biological and geological contexts, then Daisyworld does the job (Kirchner 2002, 401) . This is precisely the reason why the "specific" details implemented in Daisyworld may ultimately matter: the model is supposed to exhibit a detailed example in which a phenomenon occurs whereas it was thought to be theoretically impossible. Although Reydon (2012, 309) seems to express scepticism about the existence of how-possibly explanations as defined by Dray, we have seen that the original Daisyworld may, interestingly, be a good candidate matching such a label. Weisberg (2013) , after others (Brandon 1990) , has claimed that "generalized modelling" (which corresponds to our "abstract models") may be used to propose how-possibly explanations in what seems to be a broader acception of how-possibly explanations. Considering Reydon's stricter conception leads us to claim that not all "abstract (or generalized) models" can be used to obtain how-possibly explanations: only "abstract and fictional" models can be used so, precisely because they contain more specific details than "abstract simpliciter" models.
(ii) Abstract simpliciter models are good for pursuing theorizing.
One reason to make abstract simpliciter models would be that abstract (computational) models are means (among others) of pursuing theorizing (Pigliucci 2013 The computer may seem like an odd place to be looking for a planetary-sized phenomenon when we could be examining the real world. However, with a sample size of only one Earth the inferences that can be drawn about the likelihood of certain features are necessarily limited. (…) By creating many virtual worlds in the computer, we can begin to examine whether features we see on Earth, such as abundant recycling and environmental regulation, are likely or unlikely phenomena once life has emerged on a planet. (Lenton and Williams 2009, 61) 33
This echoes the debate in the GH literature about whether environmental variables on Earth have in fact been regulated by life and, if this is the case, whether it was due to pure chance or due to a necessary regulation by life (Watson 1999) . Indeed, it may be the case that certain environmental variables are regulated on Earth, or that Earth would not have been habitable today if life had not influenced the environment. These questions can be investigated through concrete observations (oceanographic and atmospheric measurements) or thanks to specific computational models (the lifespan models). But in order to assess how likely (or necessary) the emergence of environmental regulation is (given the important properties of life), one needs to explore different counterfactual scenarios and one does so thanks to an abstract (computational) model. In order to evaluate the "likelihood of certain features", which in the context of the above quotation is the likelihood of environmental regulation given the influence of life on its environment, one thus needs to assess the abstract properties of life. In this sense, the discussion over the legitimacy and epistemic purpose of GH abstract models echoes the debate in the A-life literature over the legitimacy of abstracting away to the fundamental properties of life while leaving aside what is taken to be contingent details, which questions the theoretical role that the concept of "life" may be able to play (Lange 1996 , Bedau 2007 One may thus compare worlds with and without the influence of life so as to bring into relief the role played by life in the actual world. What-if models may here be crucial steps in the explanation of a phenomenon. This interpretation would fit with the conception of causality defended by Woodward (2010) and seems to fit perfectly with the account of explanation given by Strevens (2004, ch. 4.3) . The procedure of progressively removing parameters from a model (the "eliminative procedure" described by Strevens) to see if the phenomenon to be explained still holds after this removal is a crucial step in determining whether the parameter is a difference-maker and whether it is a good explanation of the phenomenon of interest.
Although the space for developing the argument is lacking here, it seems that this strategy ("what-if" or eliminative procedure) would be as essential to non-causal accounts of explanation as it is to Strevens' causal account. Let us see how this would work with Huneman's (2010) topological explanations, a kind of explanation that may be thought of as non-causal (but need not be so depending on one's conception of causality): artificially removing connections or knots from a topological networks to see if certain properties (robustness, stability, etc.) still hold seems to be an important step in attributing explanatory power to the given topology of the initial network.
Let me summarize the role of the different kinds of model discussed in the preceding:
-"Abstract and fictional" models may enable one to obtain how-possibly explanations (they help one to show that an event that was previously thought to be theoretically impossible is in fact possible); the original Daisyworld of Watson and Lovelock was used in this way.
-"Abstract simpliciter" models allow one to pursue theorizing and explore the likelihood of the clustering of certain properties; some later variants of Daisyworld as well as A-life models such as FLASK were used for these purposes, to assess the conditions under which "regulation" will emerge.
-"What-if" models may be construed as a necessary enterprise in imputing explanatory (or causal) power to one variable of interest. Different models were presented to use this strategy: Daisyworld, Lenton and Von Bloh lifespan model.
In the section dedicated to the description of the models we raised the question of the epistemic priority of "abstract simpliciter" over "abstract and fictional" models: in the past decade, some Daisyworld models were explicitly made "abstract simpliciter", whereas others, such as Boyle et al. (2011) or Weaver and Dyke (2012) , fully aware of Kirchner's critiques, conserved the "abstract and fictional style". The issue of giving priority to one or the other model only makes sense in the context where they are used to obtain similar knowledge. Boyle et al. (2011) , as well as Weaver and Dyke (2012) , did not propose "abstract and fictional" models to obtain how-possibly explanation, in contrast to Watson and Lovelock (1983) . They rather pursued the kind of knowledge obtained by "abstract simpliciter" models.
Is one strategy better than the other? I would argue that they are epistemologically on a par, although one may have an aesthetic preference for one or the other. Indeed one can wonder what is the relevant difference (in the context where one wants to obtain abstract knowledge)
between Daisyworld style models and abstract models such as FLASK. There is none. The first model describes fictive specific entities with which we are not familiar (huge daisies) while the second describes more familiar entities (flasks of microbes), but then both warn the reader: the specific story does not matter, so please, abstract away from these details (do not look for giant daisies in the world, do not look for specific nutrients). Since the specific details do not matter given the purpose of the model, then whether these details are "fictive" or more "familiar" should not worry us.
This brings me back to the idea implicitly developed by Kirchner (and recalled in the second section) that some models may be of greater value than others. We have seen here that the "pressing" issues than others) can not be discussed on a purely epistemological ground. The issue is not how to best allocate epistemic resources to attain a unique goal, it is a question of comparing different epistemologically legitimate goals. So the only pertinent level of argumentation is social and not epistemological.
Conclusion
Let us sum up the main arguments developed throughout this paper.
First, it is simply not the case that testability -understood as the comparison of the output of a model to empirical data -is always a necessary procedure to have reliable models. This procedure is only available in the case of explanatory models when one wants to discriminate between possible explanations implemented in the model structure (but even in these cases, this procedure is not the only one important for assessing the reliability of the model). In the case of predictive models, the comparison is not possible. One then uses the model in order to obtain the output (the prediction) and one relies on the prediction in virtue of relying on the source procedures that enabled the predictions (the initial parameters and the model structure).
The prominent role that the explanatory/predictive distinction plays when it comes to the reliability and testability of a model makes it clear that the initial typology based on These two main arguments, although stemming from a discussion of a given field of science (GH), aimed at contributing to general philosophical considerations on the role of models.
Back to GH now, they rebut the principal epistemological criticisms addressed to GH models by Kirchner. Besides, this analysis sheds light on one particular aspect of GH: the special emphasis that it puts on the role of life. Consider first the particularity of the what-if models of GH in which the influence of life is switched off. The authors never switch off, say, the influence of geodynamics on the climate, but always contrast scenarios with and without the influence of life. This brings into relief the particular interest GH shows for life: GH is above all an hypothesis about the consequences of life on Earth. Consider now the implication of developing abstract models of the interaction of life with its environment. These models require something that actual and specific models do not: they require a definition of life.
The postulate that living beings may be distinct from non-living entities is in fact a bet; it may very well in the end turn out that the influence of life has nothing special as to its magnitude, as to how it affects habitability or how it regulates the environment. Interestingly, GH, by working on such questions and deploying such strategies to answer them, joins up with the fields of research (A-life, exobiology, origins of life) which, given their question of interest, need to rethink the problem of the definition of life (something the other branches of biology need not do; see Morange 2003 , Gayon 2010 ). This should not come as a surprise since the definition of life was one of the fundamental starting points of GH (Lovelock 1965) and since the fields of research mentioned above emerged from roughly the same institutional and intellectual context (Dick and Strick 2005) .
